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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
XORTHCREST,

I~C.,

a corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
- vs.\V ALI(ER BAN"K & TRUST COM-

PAXY, a corporation, as executor
of the last will and testament and
estate of LUCIER. THOMAS, who
was sometimes known as L. R.
THOMAS, deceased; JOHN LIVINGSTON THO~iAS and ADELAIDE R. THO~iAS, his wife;
and GERTRUDE THOMAS
GARDNER,

Case No.

7735

Defendants and Respondents,

HrGH L. THOMAS, JR., unmarried; WALTER WRIGHT; and
H. C. BROWNLEE, Trustee,
Defenda;nts.

Reply Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT ON REPLY

In reply to the Brief of respondents, Northcrest
files this Reply Brief. The points to be argued in reply
follow.
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NORTHCREST, INC., VS.

STATEMENT OF POINTS IN REPLY
Northcrest's Title Through Utah Savings And Trust
Company.
1. Respondents Failed To Establish By Clear, Con-

vincing, Unequivocal And Conclusive Evidence That
The Deed From LucieR. Thomas (And Husband) To
Utah Savings And Trust Company Was Intended A~
A Mortgage.
2. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company
Attempting To Prove The Deed As A Mortgage Was
Incompetent After It Had Conveyed To N orthcrest.
Northcrest's Title Through Hugh L. Thomas, Jr.
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknowl-

edged The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent.
2. The Certificate Of Acknowledgment, By The Law of
Evidence, Equalized the Notary's Testimony Repudiating It. Hugh, Jr.'s Attempt To Corroborate The
Notary Was Incompetent. The Evidence Was Thus.
Left Equipoised And Respondents Failed To Sustain
The Burden To Prove The Certificate Was False.
3. Respondents' Claim Of Forgery Not Established.
N orthcrest's Title Through H. H. Hempstead.
1. Unfounded Charges ~Regarding Northcrest's Quiet

Title Suit Against Hempsteads.
2. The Deed From _Lucie .. To H. _H. Hempstead Was
Delivered.
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3

3. \YhateYer r:l'ax Title Lneie Obtained From Spencer
Clawson Inured rro I-Iempstead, Her Grantee, Under
Her Prior Warranty Deed To Him.
4. Respondents Failed To Prove A Valid Tax Title In
Spencer Clawson.
Northcrest Was Not Estopped To Acquire The Utah
Savings And The Hempstead Titles.
Respondents Failed To Establish Adverse Title In
Lucie R. Thomas And The Evidence Is Wholly Insufficient
To Support The Finding.
Correction As To The Yellow Lots.
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NORTHCREST, INC., VS.

ARGUMENT ON REPLY
NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS
AND TRUST COMPANY
1. Respondents Failed To Establish By Clear, Convincing,
Unequivocal And Conclusive Evidence That The Deed
From LucieR. Thomas (And Husband) To Utah Savings
And Trust Company Was Intended As A Mortgage.

Respondents failed entirely here.
They admit the onus, starting this part of their
Brief with a heading asserting that they did establish
the deed as a mortgage by "clear, convincing and unequivocal" evidence. (Their Brief, Page 16). The decisions by this court required such proof. Coray vs.
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. Thornley L. L. Company vs. Gailey, 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. Gibbons
vs. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 135 P. 2d 105. Pender vs.
Anderson, (Utah), 235 P. 2d 360.
They admit also "the mutual intention of the parties
must be proved". Crheir Brief, Page 17). Of course,
they must. This is clearly the law.
But the mutual intention was not shown. At most,
evidence only of the bank's intention was given. McGee,
the bank's officer, was the only witness. His evidence,
we submit, was not even proof of the bank's (grantee's)
intention. But, assume for argument that it was, still
there was a total lack of evidence about the intention of
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Lucie and her husband, the grantors. Their intention,
by this record, is a total blank.
Please turn to Brief of Appellant, Pages 6 to 18.
The entire lack of the intention of Lucie and her husband is fully shown there.
But, respondents contend Lucie went on to treat
the property as still hers by paying taxes, etc. The
character of the conYeyance, ho·wever, is determined by
the agreement at the time; not subsequently.
'' ... The character of the transaction is fixed at
its inception; if an instrument is a mortgage at
its inception, it remains so with all the incidents
thereof, if it is not a mortgage at the time of its
inception, it cannot be converted into such by a
subsequent act of the parties." 36 Am. Jur. Mortgages §125.
" . . . the question whether a deed absolute in
form is to be taken as a mortgage depends on
the intention of the parties with respect to it at
the time of its execution ... '' 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §36.
Lucie's subsequent conduct claimed is purely selfserving and amounts to no more than an implied declaration that she later claimed an interest in the property;
whereas, an express declaration of claim would have
availed respondents nothing. This court has said just
that. Look:
"Should we assume without proof that Ruthrauff
himself paid a share of the annual tax on the
claim prior to his death, it would not affect or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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NORTHCREST, INC., VS.

impair his prior deed in 1902 as a conveyance.
It would be at most an implied declaration that
he still had or claimed an interest in the property.
But an implied declaration to this effect by Ruthrauff is of no more value than his express declaration would be in his own favor or that of his
heirs. An express declaration of a claim by a
grantor in a deed, self-serving and in disparagement of his own solemn deed, is a nullity." Ruthrauff vs. Silver King Western Min. & Mill Co.,
95 Utah 279, 80 P. 2d 338, 343.
The result is :

''It is not evidence in his own favor or of those
claiming under him. The principle of this rule
is well stated in 22 C.J.S., at pages 234-236, title
'Evidence', Sees. 213, 215, 217-219; Smith v.
Hanson, 34 Utah 171, 96 P. 1087, 18 L.R.A., N.S.,
520; Diaz v. Industrial Comm., 80 Utah 77, 13 P.
2d 307; Baird v. Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974".
I d.
Respondents finally say N orthcrest ''has suggested
no other conclusion" than that the deed was intended
to be a mortgage. (Their Brief, Page 19). But, it isn't
up to N orthcrest to do any suggesting. It has no burden.
Respondents are the ones who are trying to prove the
mortgage. They have the burden, not N orthcrest. (Brief
of Appellant, Pages 23, 47). They admit it. (Their Brief.
Page 16).
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS
AND TRUST COMPANY (Cont'd.)
2. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company
Attempting To Prove The Deed As A Mortgage Was
Incompetent After It Had Conveyed To N orthcrest.
Respondents admit again.
They admit the rule:
" . . . the general rule that a grantor may not,
after parting with his title, make statements or
admissions in disparagement of his title ... '' Respondents' Brief, Page 20.
For a discussion of the rule, turn to Brief of Appellant, Page 25.
But, respondents deny the rule applies here. They
say the bank's evidence by its officer, McGee, (3 years
after it had conveyed to Northcrest) was not what constituted the "statement" or "declaration" in this case.
By their admission, if it did, then it was clearly incompetent, being made> after the conveyance.
They say what constituted the "declaration" was
the bank's memo of a security transaction entered on
the loan cards (Exhibit 8) years ago (1914) when the
bank had title; .ergo, they argue, the "declaration" was
made before and not after the bank conveyed to Northcrest. This is so ingenious that no one else has ever
thought of it before; not even respondents' erudite
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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counsel at the trial. And, we have now searched in vain
for a similar assertion in the texts and cases. But it is
a stranger there so far as we can find. The reason must
be apparent. To make a declaration is to declare and
"declare" means, it is said:
''To make known ; tell openly or publicly; proclaim formally; publish; make a solemn affirmation before witnesses" etc. Webster's Modern
Reference Dictionary.
And a "dcelaration", it Is said, means:
"The act of declaring or proclaiming; that which
is declared; an assertion; publication". Id.
2 Words and Phrases, Page 1904, says:
''The word 'declare' signifies to make known,
to assert to others ; to show forth ... '' etc.
A "declaration" requires (1) a declarant, and,
( 2) a making known, a ''proclaiming''. In other words,
a communicating. But "to make known" or "communicate", something else is also required: (3) a hea-rer;
someone to whom the declaration is "made known" or
''proclaimed'' or communicated.
This must be so, for in the cases '''here disparaging
statements or declarations of former owners are recorded, they \Yere usually related by a "hearer" of the
statement; one to whom the grantor "made known",
''told openly'', ''proclaimed'', ''asserted'' or commumicated the defect in his title while he owned it.
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But test the situation here. Utah Savings made only
a prin1te, silent, secret entry on the loan cards (Exhibit
8) years before. This \Yas only the silent entry of a
secret thought. That secret wa:::; not then "made known",
''told openly", "proclaimed'' or "affirmed before witnesses'' or ''asserted to others'' at all. It was not communicated. It lay hidden among the bank's records,
silent and unproclairned, 37 years (1914 to 1951) until
over 3 years after the bank conveyed to N orthcrest 1n
1947. Utah SaYings made no declaration up to 1951.
But, in1951 Utah Savings did make a "declaration".
rrhat was when the declaration here was first made. It
was at the trial. Utah Savings then "declared" by its
officer, McGee, that it had formerly (37 years ago) held
a warranty deed-not this specified deed, just some deed
-as security. But this was after it had parted with title
and conveyed to N orthcrest. That declaration, therefore,
was incompetent under the rule. And the rule is confessed by respondents. The trial court erred in admitting this incompetent declaration by Utah Savings after
it had conveyed to N orthcrest.
Respondents cite the Shop Book
Rule as supporting the security entry on the loan cards
(Exhibit 8). (Their Brief 23). Shop books are admissible as evidence, prima facie. 20 Am. J ur. Evidence
~1043. But not if they are incompetent for some other
reason; for being, as here, part of the forbidden declarations of a prior O\vner.
Shop Book Rule.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

NORTHCREST, INC., VS •

.Ancient Document Rule. The 30-year Ancient Document Rule cannot save respondents, either. This rule
does not go to the competency of documents but more
properly to their manner of proof; dispensing with
their first being authenticated by testimony. But, they
must be relevant ( 20 Am. J ur. Evidence §932) and, of
course, otherwise competent to be admissible.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR.
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknowledged

The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent.

Respondents argue the pros and cons of this proposition of law. (Their Brief, Page 24).
We adm.it the courts are divided. We frankly told
the court so in our Brief of Appellant, Page 31. It is a
difficult problem. Opposed in every case are the rights
of a grantor on the one hand; those of innocent persons
dealing on the faith of the recorded acknowledgment,
on the other.
The question is not may an acknowledgment be
proved false. It is narrower, only: May it be proved
false by the notary who has already solemnly certified
that it is genuine1 The answer1 There are authorities
on each side. The court will have to choose.
Respondents ascribe ''great courage'' to this deceitful notary. (Their Brief, Page 43). Seeking to provide her with credibility of sorts they ennoble her with
traits of great courage and forthrightness in forswearing
her constitutional oath as notary and renouncing her
certificate on the deed. This sanctifies her testimony,
they argue, for thus she invited a damage suit by Northcrest. But, if this notary was noble, then so were all
the notaries in the books who testified that their certificates were lies. Of what avail is a damage suit against
a notary like this on a $500.00 bond~
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NORTHCREST, INC., VS.

NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR. (Cont'd.)
2. The Certificate Of Acknowledgment, By The Law Of
Evidence, Equalized The Notary's Testimony Repudiating It. Hugh, Jr.'s Attempt To Corroborate The
Notary Was Incompetent. The Evidence Was Thus Left
Equipoised And Respondents Failed To Sustain The
Burden To Prove The Certificate Was False.

''. . . The decisions disclose a very decided tendency on the part of the courts to attach weight
to certificates of acknowledgment and to view
attempts to discredit them with suspicion and
distrust.
. . . a high degree of proof is required. It frequently has been stated . . . the evidence must
be clear, cogent, and convincing beyond reasonable controversy.
. . . It has been said that such evidence must be
almost as strong as that required to correct a
mistake in a deed. Thus, it appears that the burden assumed by the assailant of the certificate is,
if the language of the rule is to be understood in
its literal sense, much greater than that usually
cast upon a party by a presumption of fact. Generally, a mere 11rcponderance of evidence is not
sufficient to overcome the certificate . ... '' 1 Am.
Jur. Acknowledgments §155.

What of the evidence here? rrhe rases say the certificate is entitled to as much weight as the notary's
subsequent denial; that it is equivalent to the sworn
testimony of one disinterested witness, and the denial
should be given hut little weight. 1 C.J.S. Arknowledg-
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ments §§ 1-!1, 1-!~. ::)parker rs. Sparker, 274 N.Y.S. 454,
152 ~lise. 867. (See Brief of Appellant, ~~[>).
''The certificate is made evidenee under the
statute. It should, therefore, be entitled to as
much, if not more, weight than the evidence of
the officer who executed it, when offered to impeach its validity." Sparker vs. Sparker, supra.
"(The certificate) is equivalent to the sworn testimony of one apparently disinterested witness.''
1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments §141.
By the foregoing, the certificate itself was (1)
equivalent to the testimony of one disinterested witness
supporting it, and, (2) entitled to as much weight as the
notary's testimony, if not more.
So the eYidence that far was at equipoise; the certificate equalized the notary's renunciation. Hence, respondents could not stop there. Remember, theirs was
the burden of proving a false certificate; not by a mere
preponderance either, but, as the first quotation above
states, by evidence which was "clear, cogent and convincing beyond reasonable controversy". 1 Am. Jur.
Acknowledgments §155, supra.
So, they called Hugh, Jr. for corroboration. Respondents say Hugh (their younger brother who got
$3200.00 from Northcrest on the strength of the deed)
corroborated the notary's denial of the acknowledgment.
Brother Hugh, respondents argue, clinched things for
them when he testified his mother was not in Salt Lake
to acknowledge the deed. (Their Brief 44). But Hugh's
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testimony was given over Northcrest's positive objection. (Tr. 81) It was wholly incompetent. It was an attempt (like McGee's testimony for Utah Savings) to make
a declaration against a former title after the grantor
(Hugh, Jr.) had conveyed to Northcrest; it also violated
his covenants of warranty in his deed to Northcrest
(Exhibit C) as well. Hugh's deed to Northcrest (Exhibit C) was a warranty deed with full covenants of
warranty. Therefore, the statute says, he warranted
"that he was fully seised of the premises; that he had
a good right to convey the same ... that he will forever
warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee ... "
etc. §78-1-11 U.C.A. But, far from "defending the title"
in his grantee, Hugh sought to assail it by saying at the
trial his mother could not have acknowledged the prior
deed to him (Exhibit B) because she was away. But,
grantors may not assail the titles of their grantees.
They are estopped.
''A grantor is generally estopped from denying
the title of his grantee or his own authority to
sell". 19 Am. J ur. Estoppel §10.
''A grantor is estopped to assert anything in
derogation of his deed." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §13.
"It is a well settled principal of the common law
that no man shall be allowed to dispute his own
solemn deed.'' 5 Thompson on Real Property
§2602.

By his statutory warranty ( §78-1-11) Hugh, Jr. warranted he was the lawful owner. This estopped him from
asserting otherwise. He was barred from testifying as
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he did against the validity of his mother's deed to him
(Exhibit B).
Northcrest objected and moved to strike Hugh's
testimony about Lucie not being in Salt Lake to acknowledge the deed, as incompetent; also as an attempt
to dispute and violate his own deed to Northcrest. (Tr.
81-82). It was overruled. (Tr. 82). This was error. In
fact, Hugh, on being led closer to the firing line, finally
refused to talk any more because of self incrimination
and was excused. ( Tr. 83).
A situation exactly similar was presented in Han.sen vs. Daniels, 73 Utah 142, 272 P. 941, where a mortgage contained covenants of warranty and the mortgagor
was afterward called to testify that another owned an
interest in the mortgaged property (sheep). This court
held the testimony incompetent as violating the warranty and written instrument.
On this evidence (1) that of the untrustworthy
notary, and, (2) the incompetent testimony of respondents' brother, Hugh, the trial court struck down the
certificate of acknowledgment. This was error.
We say this does not present a question of credibility or weight at all. It is only a question of applying
the rule of evidence. The certificate itself equalized the
denial of the notary. It was equal to the testimony of
one disinterested witness. And, Hugh's testimony in
corroboration was incompetent because (1) it violated
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his covenant of warranty in his deed to N orthcrest, and,
(2) it was an attempted disparagement of his former
title after he conveyed to Northcrest.
Respondents are left thus: Hugh's incompetent
corroboration must be ruled out. The notary's denial
failed to outweigh her certificate. Respondents have not
sustained the burden of proof to nullify the acknowledgment.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR. (Cont'd.)
3. Respondents' Claim Of Forgery Not Established.
Respondents argue needlessly that the signature on
the deed (Exhibit B) from Lucie to son, Hugh, Jr. was
not signed by her. ('J.1heir Brief 40). They need not
argue that. N orthcrest admits it. But the argument
say8 the deed was proved a forgery. Not so. All respondents proved (and all Northcrest admits) is that
the deed was not in Lucie's hand. There is quite a difference.
A forged deed, to be sure, passes no title. It is
spurious and null. But simple proof (or admission) that
a signature is not in the hand of a named signer does
not establish forgery. The proof must show that the
signature was not authorized. State vs. Jones, 81 Utah
503, 20 P. 2d 614. See Brief of Appellant, 39-40.
Respondents' argument of forgery assumes too
much. It assumes exactly what is up for inquiry herethe validity or invalidity of Lucie's signature to the
deed.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
H. H. HEMPSTEAD
1. Unfounded Charges Regarding Northcrest's Quiet Title

Suit Against Hempsteads.

'' ... if none of the relatives ... will accept, ...
a person having a claim in or adverse to the
estate shall be entitled to letters (of administration) ... " §102-4-3 U.C.A.
''Administration may be granted to one or more
competent persons . . . at the request of the
person entitled filed in court.'' §102-4-1 U.C.A.
H. H. Hempstead's estate was first probated in
California. His wife, Lucy S. Hempstead, survived. She
was sole devisee under his will and his only heir. This
was stated and proved by respondents' counsel himself.
(Tr. 87). Hempstead lived in San Francisco. (Respondents' Brief 47).
After Hempstead died, N orthcrest secured a deed
from his wife (sole devisee and heir) to the West 40
acre tract (less the 20 x 30 rods. See Sketch, Brief of
Appellant, 42). ~orthcrest thereby got the full Hempstead title which had devolved on Hempstead's widow
on his death. N orthcrest thus became "a person having
a claim in or adverse to the estate'' of Hempstead. As
such, and as authorized by the quoted statute, it was
then entitled to letters of administration in its own name
or to nominate another ''competent person or persons''.
It did. It petitioned the District Court, Salt Lake
County, and nominated A. P. Lakin and secured his ap-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ET AL.

19

pointment as administrator with Hempstead's will annexed in Utah. This the statutes specifically authorized
and provided for. Northcrest then also sued and got a
decree quieting title against ( 1) Mrs. Hempstead, the
sole heir and devisee, and (2) Hempstead's administrator.
But respondents criticize this procedure. They
charge that this might amount to fraud upon the court
and Hempstead's creditors. (Their Brief 47). Hempstead's widow (sole heir and devisee) got the property
from Hempstead by his death. It was hers. She was
then the sole owner. And upon this record there were
no creditors of Hempstead. His creditors, if any, must
have been provided for by the California probate of his
estate where he lived. And the court in the Utah quiet
title proceedings must have been advised in the premises
and well able to look out for its judicial self. Upon this
record there were no creditors. There are none. But,
if there were, it will be time enough to hear from them,
if and when they complain. Respondents and their
counsel cannot appoint themselves to look after Hempstead's creditors. Respondents and their counsel have
no part of the Hempstead estate. They are neither
creditors, heirs or devisees. Hempstead's widow was
the sole heir and devisee. Not respondents. Not their
counsel. What concern of respondents or their counsel
is it as to what happened to Hempstead's estate~ It
passed to his widow. And, are respondents or their
<·ounsel the court's keeper in the quiet title action?
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Respondents and their eager counsel are not appointed
to protect Hempstead's creditors nor the court. Just
whom then are they looking after? Those proceedings
do not concern them. They are total strangers thereto.
Let the creditors (if any) and the court in the quiet
title action (if it deems itself imposed upon) come forward, if they will. It will be time enough to hear them
if and when they do. N orthcrest and we, its counsel,
will respond willingly and confidently. The statute sets
the authority for what was done. Smoke screens labeled
fraud ill become their makers. They oftentimes smoke
out those who set them-even lawyers. Respondents'
charges are a complete departure from their counsel's
statement at the trial: ''Now I don't mean to imply
there was any impropriety in so doing". (Tr. 92).
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
H. H. HEMPSTEAD (Cont'd.)
2. The Deed From Lucie To H. H. Hempstead Was
Delivered.

Respondents say the deed from Lucie to Hempstead
(Exhibit F) was recorded by Lucie herself and, therefore, they argue, no delivery was established and Hempstead got no title thereby.
But, recording creates a presumption (rebuttable
though it may be) of delivery.
''As a general rule the filing and recording of a
deed is prima facie evidence of delivery, but this
presumption is rebuttable. The record of a deed
by the grantor is presumptive evidence of a most
cogent character tending to show delivery, for it
is tantamount to a public proclamation by the
grantor at a public place, intended for the world
to act upon, that the grantor had in apt and due
form transferred his title (and thereby his land)
to another.'' 7 Thompson on Real Property §4185.
"The recording of a deed ordinarily creates a
rebuttable presumption of its delivery to, and its
acceptance by, the grantee." 26 C.J.S. Deeds
§187.
The recording of the deed to Hempstead established,
prima facie, its delivery. Respondents had the right to
offer evidence to overcome that presumption. They offered none. They proved nothing. The presumption that
the deed \vas delivered stands unrefuted.
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Respondents cite Chamberlain vs. Larsen, 83 Utah
420, 29 P. 2d 355. But they are wrong. That case says:
''. . . the recording of a deed is likewise evidence of
delivery". 29 P. 2d 361.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
H. H. HEMPSTEAD (Cont'd.)
3. Whatever Tax Title Lucie Obtained From Spencer
Clawson Inured To Hempstead, Her Grantee, Under Her
Prior Warranty Deed To Him.

Respondents contend the Hempstead title was extinguished by tax sale. (Their Brief 48). This is based
entirely on the abstract of title in evidence. (Exhibit 11).
But, the abstract (Page 35 thereof) shows that when
Lucie R. Thomas deeded to Hempstead (1908) by warranty deed, the taxes were already delinquent for the
prior year (1907). (Abstract, Page 32). Lucie's deed
to Hempstead is shown in full as Exhibit F. It was a
warranty deed. And it contained no exceptions. It was
a full warranty. Consequently, she thereby warranted
as against the already delinquent tax of 1907. And that
warranty estopped her from asserting anything, including this delinquent tax, against Hempstead and his
grantees. (See Page 14, supra).
Furthermore, Spencer Clawson, to whom the auditor's tax deed (1912) ran, (Abstract, Page 43) afterward quit-claimed his interest to Lucie R. Thomas in
1915. (Abstract, Page 49). That after-acquired title
(so-called) which Lucie got from Clawson then immediately inured to the benefit of Hempstead, to whom she
had previously conveyed by warranty deed. The statute
f-iaid so.
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"After acquired title inures to prior grantee. If any

person shall hereafter convey any real estate by
conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee
simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such
conveyance have the legal estate in such real
estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the
legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors,
or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid
as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at
the time of the conveyance.'' §1979 Compiled
Laws of Utah 1907. §4879 Compiled Laws of
Utah 1919. §78-1-9 Revised.Statutes of Utah 1933.
§78-1-9 U.C.A. 1943.
But respondents admit the rule. For they say it
applies to a 1/3 interest - which they say Hugh, Jr. inherited from his mother, Lucie, after his deed to Northcrest (Exhibit C). Look:
"After the date of that deed Lucie R. Thomas
died and Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. as one of her
heirs and devisees, succeeded to an undivided
one-third interest in the lands in suit, subject
however to the probate of his mother's estate.
Under the doctrine of after acquired title, appellant (N orthcrest) acquired an undivided onethird interest in lands by virtue of its deed from
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr .... " etc. (Parentheses and
emphasis ours). (Their Brief, 53.)
In fact, the award in respondent's findings to Northcrest of an undivided third is predicated on respondents'
proposition that after Hugh conveyed to Northcrest, he
inherited 1/3 from his mother, Lucie, and that afteracquired inheritance passed to Northcrest by his prior
deed.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
H. H. HEMPSTEAD (Cont'd'.)
4. Respondents Failed To Prove A Valid Tax Title In
Spencer Clawson.

We have just seen that whatever tax title Lucie got
from Clawson inured to her grantee, H. H. Hem~stead,
under her earlier warranty deed to him. But, we shall
now see that no Yalid tax title was proved by respondents.
"It has long been held in this jurisdiction that
one who relies on a tax title must show that all
of the requirements of the law were complied
with in the issuance of that tax title. Asper v.
:\loon, 24 Utah 241, 67 P. 409; Bean v. Fairbanks,
46 Utah 513, 151 P. 338; Bolognese v. Anderson,
87 Utah 450, 44 P. 2d 706." Anson vs. Ellison,
104 Utah 576, 140 P. 2d 653.
This is the same as the common law rule which:
" ... was strict in its requirement that the holder
of the tax title should by his evidence exhibit the
proceedings, from step to step." (Italics added).
51 Am. Jur. Taxation §1091.
The alleged tax sale and deed were in 1908 and 1912
respectively. (Abstract, Pages 32, 43). So they were
governed by Compiled Laws of Utah 1907. To aid a
tax title holder in his proof ''from step to step'', the
law at that time helped-part way-but only in regard
to the auditor's tax deed. It said, the tax deed, - " ...
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein". §2629 Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, Cf. §6030 ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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piled Laws of Utah 1917. §80-10-66 Revised Statutes of
Utah 1933. §80-10-68 (7) U.C.A. 1943.
But no such efficacy was applied to the certificate
of sale. Its form was specifically prescribed and set out
in full detail by the statute. §2624 Compiled Laws of
Utah 1907. The 1917 Compilation varied the form, but
still the Legislature provided no evidentiary value to
the certificate. §6021 Compiled Laws of Utah 1917. It
was 1921 before the certificate of sale was made prima
facie evidence, the Legislature saying:
"(The certificate of sale) herein provided for
... shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity
of all proceedings connected with the assessment
notice, equalization, levies, advertisement and
" §6021 Laws of Utah
sale of the property .
1921.
But, the 1921 law did not make 1908 certificates evidence. Statutes operate prospectively, not retroactively.
Furthermore, the 1921 statutory certificate (set forth in
the law) varied in form from the 1907 one. And the 1921
law was addressed to 1921 (and subsequent) certificates,
for it said: "the certificate of sale herein provided for"
should be evidence; not a 1907 certificate.
But, assume for argument that the tax certificate
here (1907) had been made evidence by the 1921 (or
even the 1943) law. In that case, the certificate and the
auditor's tax deed both would be prima facie evidence
of the acts and things recited only when put in evidence.
But respondents did not put them in evidence. All that
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was introduced 'vas the abstract of title. It does not
even purport to exhibit the contents of either the certificate or tax deed. All the abstract contains is a brief
me·mo of each. (Abstract, Pages 32, 43). The form of
the certificate is not set forth to be tested for its compliance with the law. Nor is the form of the tax deed
set out so as to show ''the facts recited therein'' to be
tested for their compliance. Respondents had access to
these recorded documents but rested upon their mere
notation in the abstract. But, that notation is not enough.
It is no more than proof that a certificate and a tax deed
were issued without disclosing their contents. It is
exactly the same as if it had been merely stipulated that
these documents were issued. This court has already
passed upon that situation and found it wanting. The
decision is well reflected in the following headnote :
"Stipulation that certificate of sale had been issued on realty sold for delinquent taxes and
county's quitclaim deed of such realty to plaintiff which deed recited that it was issued pursuant
to statute relating to sale of land for delinquent
taxes did not make a 'prima facie case' of title
in plaintiff." Anson vs. Ellison, 104 Utah 576,
140 P. 2d 653.
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NORTH CREST WAS NOT ESTOPPED TO ACQUIRE
THE UTAH SAVINGS AND THE HEMPSTEAD TITLES

Respondents misconceive the rule. They argue that
Northcrest, having taken one title, (through Hugh, Jr.)
was estopped to later acquire and assert these other
titles (from Hempstead and Utah Savings) against
Lucie's estate and devisees. (Their Brief, 48).
As to Hugh, Jr., exactly the reverse would be the
rule. Having conveyed and warranted to Northcrest,
Hugh would be the one estopped. He could not afterward acquire and assert an adverse title against Northcrest. The estoppel bars him, not N orthcrest. But he
defaulted. He claims no estoppel in his favor. Respondents cannot claim it for him.
As to respondents, if they mean to argue that Northcrest became estopped as to Lucie or her estate or devisees (John and Gertrude) the argument is a curious
one. They furiously contend that Lucie's deed to Hugh
(Exhibit B) was null; in other words, that this title
Northcrest claims under and which created the estoppel
was no title at all! If that is so, no estoppel resulted;
none will by a void deed.

Respondents confuse the rule. Their citations disclose the misconception. Those offered (Their Brief, 49,
50) all deal with situations where a vendee is purchasing
but has not paid out, and meanwhile acquires an adverse
title and asserts it against his vendor. But, in that
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executory relation, the law refuses to permit him to do
so. He is estopped. It is as if Northcrest had been purchasing on contract from Hugh but bought up the Utah
Savings and Hempstead titles before paying him in full
and sought to assert them against Hugh to avoid paying
him out. X orthcrest, in that situation, would surely be
estopped and could not avoid payment. But the estoppel
would only run in Hugh's favor, not Lucie's or her
devisees. They were not parties to Hugh's and Northcrest 's supposed contract.
The estoppel described extends to many relations:
~Iortgagor

and Mortgagee,
36 Am. Jur. Mortgages §241.
Columbia Trust Co. vs. Nielsen, 76 Utah 129,
287 P. 926.

Landlord and Tenant,
32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, §113, §118.
Vend or and Vendee,
35 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, §381.
Tenants in Common,
Columbia Tnrst Co. vs. Nielsen, supra.
But, in very case where the estoppel arises, it IS
out of an obligation, legal or moral, to another which
renders it unfair to acquire antagonistic rights against
such other. 35 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser §381.
Northcrest owed no obligation to Lucie, John or Gertrude. It had no dealings with them at all. And, after
it pai<l Hugh in full, it owed him none. So, it was free
to acquire, as it did, the Utah Savings and Hempstead
titles. It was not estopped.
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N orthcrest quieted title against Hempstead's widow.
(Exhibit 10, Files in action by Northcrest vs. Hempstead.) Respondents say Northcrest is estopped to claim
the Hempstead title because it alleged therein and got a
judgment holding it was of no force. The estoppel
claimed is an estoppel "by record". 31 C.J.S. Estoppel
§5. But allegations in a pleading of a prior action "do
not as a rule operate in a subsequent case, proceeding
or transaction as a technical estoppel by record against
the party making them". 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §7. But,
respondents were not parties to the N orthcrest-Hempstead quiet title action. Nor do they claim through it or
thereunder. Consequently, they cannot claim the alleged
estoppel because,'' Estoppels by record exist only as between the
same parties or those in legal privity with them,
and cannot be insisted on by one who is not himself bound thereby." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §8.
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RESPONDENTS FAILEU TO ESTABLISH ADVERSE
TITLE IN LUCIE R. THOMAS AND THE EVIDENCE IS
WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE F'INDING.

Hespondents say that they proved Lucie established
title by adverse possession and that it extinguished the
outstanding titles of Utah Savings and Hempstead. The
court made a finding of adverse possession. (Their Brief,
51, 52).
There was no testimony by any witness on this point.
Absolutely none. The only evidence relating to this at
all is a stipulation that Lucie paid taxes. It was stipulated that she paid the taxes of 1918 to 1935, and from
1938 through 1945. (The lands were sold for taxes in
1935 and 1936). (Tr. 100).
But Lucie's deed to Hempstead (Exhibit F) was in
1908. It was outstanding against her ever after. Northcrest secured that title from Hempstead's widow (1950)
and quieted title against Hempstead's estate (1951).
This title covered the West 40 acre tract (less 20 x 30
rods). And Lucie's deed to Utah Savings was 1914.
(Exhibit D). It was also outstanding against her ever
after and Northcrest acquired that title from Utah Savings in 1947 (Exhibit E). This covered all of the property, both 40 acre tracts (less the 20 x 30 rods).
So, during all of the years in question (1918-1945)
and long before, these two deeds were outstanding.
Those deeds established, of course, a "legal title" in
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Hempstead and Utah Savings. (One or the other on the
West 40 and Utah Savings on the East 40 acre tract).
Hempstead and Utah Savings respectively were, therefore, deemed to have been in possession all the while,
and it was up to respondents to prove otherwise. The
statute says so.
"104-2-7. Adverse Possession-Possession Presumed
in Owner. In every action for the recovery of real

property, or the possession thereof, the person
establishing a legal title to the property shall be
presumed to have been possessed thereof within
the time required by law; and the occupation of
the property by any other person shall be deemed
to have been under and in subordination to the
legal title, unless it appears that the property has
been held and possessed adversely to such legal
title for seven years before the commencement of
the action.''
This court has said :
''According to this the presumption is that the
legal title is in the owner, unless it appears that
the property was held and possessed adversely
to him for seven years.'' Funk vs. Anderson, 22
Utah 238, 61 P. 1006.
Respondents didn't prove anything about Lucie's
occupancy. The record is silent as to that; wholly barren. No one testified about possession at all. Respondents offered no evidence on that point. There was none.
They stood upon payment of the taxes alone. Obviously,
that was valueless. And yet the trial court made the
astonishing finding that Lucie was at all times in exclu-
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s1ve possession! (Finding 20, Tr. 110). There 1s no
evidence that Lucie occupied these lands, absolutely none.
But, if Lucie had actually occupied the lands (which
she did not) still, by the statute and decisions, she would
be deemed to have done so "under and in subordination"
to the "legal title" established in Hempstead and Utah
Savings by their respective deeds, which were outstanding at all times claimed. The burden thus rested on
respondents to prove she ''possessed and occupied'' the
lands adversely. To prove that kind of possession and
occupancy, they were bound by statute to establish (and
they didn't even try) not only actual occupancy by Lucie
but also that she had (1) cultivated or improved, or, (2)
fenced the lands, or, (3) used them for supply of fuel,
fencing timber or pasturage, etc. §104-2-9, §104-2-11
U.C.A. This is the only way land can be possessed adcersely. The statutory methods are exclusive. Jenkins
vs. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P. 2d 871. H.O.L.C. vs.
Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P. 2d 160. Central P. Ry. Co.
vs. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554.
There was no evidence of Lucie's occupancy at all.
On such a record there can be no adverse possession. It
was so held in Jenkins vs. Morgan, supra, this court
saying:
"\Ve find no evidence in the record that the defendants have complied with the requirements
therein set forth . . . It would thus appear that
defendants have failed to establish occupation or
possession within the limits of the statutory requirements." Jenkins rs. JVl organ, supra.
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Since there was no evidence whatever that Lucie
(1) occupied these lands, and, (2) that she also cultivated, improved, fenced or otherwise did with them as
the statute requires, respondents failed to establish any
adverse possession and the court's finding that she did
is not sustained and must be set aside.
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CORRECTION AS TO THE YELLOW LOTS

Respondents haYe pointed out (Their Brief, 9) that
in our first Brief of Appellant (Pages 46, 50) Northcrest
conceded 2/3 of the 32 "yellow lots" was properly
awarded them, leaving 1j3 properly awarded to Northcrest.
\Ye confess a contingent correction, 1n part, must
be made.
The yellow lots are within the 20 x 30 rod strip in
the \Vest 40 acre tract. (See ~lap, Exhibit A). This
strip is platted and is Capitol Heights second filing. (Respondents' Brief, 3).
Lucie's deeds (1) to Utah Savings, and, (2) to Hempstead (Exhibits E and F) both excluded this 20 x 30
rod strip. Lucie's deed to Hugh, Jr. skirted out around
the 20 x 30 rod strip also. (Exhibit B). But, it actually
included the yellow lots therein in a separate paragraph
by referring to them (Paragraph 2 therein) by specific
reference to the lot number of each lot. Hugh's deed to
Northcrest, which followed, conveyed all of Capitol
Heights second filing (which, of course, included the
yellow lots. (Exhibit C).
Therefore, if Lucie's deed to Hugh is sustained,
then X orthcrest must be awarded the entire property
and cannot be limited to a 1/3 interest in the yellow lots.
In that case, those lots passed from Lucie-to-Hugh-to
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Northcrest. We acknowledge our error in the Brief of
Appellant in this respect accordingly.
If, however, Lucie's deed to Hugh is not sustained,
then N orthcrest 's title comes through Hempstead or
Utah Savings. But Lucie's deeds to them did not include
the tract containing the yellow lots. Therefore, in such
case, N orthcrest must have only a lj3 interest in the
yellow lots which went to Hugh by inheritance from his
mother and passed and inured to N orthcrest by his prior
deed to it.
To this extent we willingly stand corrected.
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CONCLUSION
All contentions of respondents have been fully met
and answered by this Reply Brief. Northcrest now
submits:
1. Respondents failed to prove by clear, convincing, unequiYocal and conclusive evidence that Lucie's
deed to Utah Savings was a mortgage. Mutual intention
must be shown. Lucie's intention is a complete blank
upon this record. :Mutual intention at the date of the
deed governs. Her action afterward proves nothing, is
only self -serving and not evidence against N orthcrest.
Ruthrauff vs. Silve-r King Weste-rn Min. & Mill. Co.,
supra.

2. Respondents admit the rule: A grantor may not
make disparaging declarations after parting with title.
The private memo on Utah Savings' loan cards was not a
declaration. It was merely a silent and private entry
not communicated or made known to anyone. The declaration was attempted at the trial by McGee, Utah
Savings' officer. It was incompetent. Utah Savings had
already conveyed to N orthcrest three years before.
3. The notary's testimony repudiating the certificate of acknowledgment was incompetent. But, if not,
it was insufficient by law to overcome the certificate
itself. The law of evidence treats the certificate as
equaling (if not outweighing) the notary's testimony
against it. Hugh's attempted corroboration was incomSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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petent because (1) it violated his warranty in his deed
to Northcrest, and, (2) it was derogatory of his title
after he had conveyed. The evidence then was only
equipoised and respondents failed in their burden of
proof.
4. Respondents proved no forgery of Lucie's deed
to Hugh. It was only shown (and admitted) to have not
been signed by her hand. There was no evidence that
the signature was not authorized and the notary's certificate, if it stands, establishes Lucie's adoption of the
signature.
5. The recording of Lucie's deed to Hempstead
established a presumptive delivery. Respondents offered
no evidence to refute that prima facie fact. The delivery
thus stands.
6. Whatever tax title, if any, Lucie got from Spencer Clawson inured to Hempstead under Lucie's prior
deed to him. The statute says so. §78-1-9. The 1907 tax
was already delinquent when she warranted to Hempstead in 1908. And, she warranted against that tax. She
and respondents (her successors) are thus estopped to
assert it against Hempstead or his successor, Northcrest.
7. Respondents proved no valid tax title in Clawson. They had the burden to do so step by step. They
introduced only the abstract. The certificate of sale and
tax deed are not set out therein; only a brief memo
thereof. Therefore, the certificate cannot be tested for
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its required statutory form nor the deed for "the facts
recited therein". Not being before us, they provide no
prima facie evidence of the sale or facts recited therein.
It is only as if it were stipulated these documents had
been issued without stating their contents. Anson vs.
Ell£son, supra ..
8. X orthcrest was not estopped to acquire the Utah
Savings and Hempstead titles. Hugh is the one estopped.
Not Northcrest. He warranted to it. Respondents are
confused. The situations they cite are not like this.
Those were executory situations where a vendee still
owing the unpaid purchase price acquired and asserted
an adverse title against his unpaid vendor. That is not
allowed. The vendee's obligation cannot be wiped out
in that fashion.
9. Respondents failed to establish adverse title in
Lucie. The finding must be set aside. There was no evidence at all about possession; none whatever. It was
stipulated Lucie paid taxes. But the record is silent on
possession. Hempstead's deed and Utah Savings' deed
were both outstanding throughout all the years in question. They "established a legal title" in them (one or
the other on the West 40 and Utah Savings on the East
40 acre tract). They, therefore, one or the other, were
deemed to be in possession and it was up to respondents
to prove otherwise. They did not even try. It was not
shown that Lucie even occupied the lands, much less
that she used them in the exclusive adverse manner re<Iuired by the statute.
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10. \Ve stand corrected on the yellow lots, provided
Lucie's deed to Hugh is sustained. For, in that case,
since that deed specifically included those lots and Hugh
also afterward conveyed them to N orthcrest, they passed
in full, not just 1j3, to Northcrest. But, if the deed from
Lucie to Hugh is not sustained, then, of course, the lots
remained with Lucie and only passed 1/3 to Hugh by
her devise upon her death and his after-acquired title
to the 1/3 inured to N orthcrest by his prior deed.
11. The court properly adjudged to N orthcrest the
stipulated 33 "white lots" in the 20 x 30 rod strip (Capitol Heights Second Filing). It also adjudged to Northcrest only 1/3 of the 32 "yellow lots" and of the rest
of the property, too. But, if Lucie's deed to Hugh (Exhibit B) was good, the judgment must be reversed outright and judgment entered to the whole for N orthcrest;
otherwise, (under the Hempstead and Utah Savings
titles) reversed and judgment entered for N orthcrest
for the whole of the property except the yellow lots and
for 1/3 in them.
12. We assert the judgment of only 1/3 to Northcrest is wrong and must be reversed, with judgment for
N orthcrest to the whole of the property.
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG
Attorneys for Appellant
January 1952

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

